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Hizbullah: The Story from Within,
by Naim Qassem (London: Saqi, 2005), 284pp
Dr Anthony McRoy
If ever there was a book for the hour, it is this – Hezbollah in its own words. Translated by Dalia Khalil, it is effectively the group’s ‘autobiography’, written by the Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General. The result is a fascinating study into the group that defeated the Americans in the 1980s, the Israelis by the start of the present millennium, and in 2006 managed to keep the mighty Israeli armed forces fighting for much longer than did three Arab armies in 1967. Qassem traces the origins of the group to ulema in the 1960s who were Islamic activists, men like the famous Imam Musa al-Sadr, the founder of Amal, p.13ff, and ‘Author of the famous slogan "Israel is an utter evil"’, a belief now probably near-universal in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Arab/Muslim world. Another figure was Ayatollah Fadlallah, a strong supporter of Khomeini’s vision, p. 17.
According to Qassem, Khomeini’s successful revolution led to most Shia ulema in Lebanon transferring their allegiance to him as the ‘Source of Imitation’ – the Shia practice of taqlid, following a senior Ayatollah. This was despite the fact that most Lebanese ulema were trained in Najaf, Iraq, and previously followed Imam al-Kho’i and Ayatollah Sadr, p. 18. However, the major spur for the creation of Hezbollah was the 1982 Israeli invasion, p. 19. Committing themselves to jihad and to supporting the Khomeinist ‘Jurist-Theologian’ concept (Vilayet i-Faqih – ‘Guardianship of the Jurist’), p. 19f, they received the blessing of the Ayatollah who dispatched Iranian Revolutionary Guards to the Bekaa to train the resistance movement, p. 20. Considering the formidable character of Hezbollah as a fighting machine, the Iranians did a remarkable job, and this should warn Britain and America against any idea of invading Iran itself – it would be like facing Hezbollah to the ‘Nth’ degree!
Being committed to the Khomeinist vision, Hezbollah is naturally dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic State in Lebanon, p. 31. However, as the 1985 ‘Open Letter’ announcing Hezbollah’s programme declares, this is dependent upon ‘a direct and free choice of the people, and not through forceful imposition as may be assumed by some’, p. 31. It is on this basis that two important aspects emerge of Hezbollah’s approach. Firstly, it is committed to the parliamentary procedure for attaining power. Whereas in despotic Shahist Iran revolution was the only way to change government, Lebanon’s parliamentary system precludes the possibility of a putchist transformation. This has enabled Hezbollah to successfully participate in the democratic structures of Lebanon and win seats. This is a rebuke to those – like apparently, the Bush Administration – who see all forms of Islamism as incompatible with parliamentary participation.
Secondly, given the religiously heterogeneous character of Lebanon, Hezbollah – although mainly a Shia organisation – has successfully reached out to other communities. This aspect of Hezbollah’s story is grossly neglected. For example, in 1992 Hezbollah began meetings with the Maronite Catholic Patriarchate, and thereafter with other professing Christians, pp. 204-27. This dialogue was based on the principle ‘that Lebanon is for all and not for one or another division’. Qassem is especially good on this issue. He notes that when the ‘Lebanese Forces’, the main Maronite militia, ‘raised the cross as a slogan to gather supporters, they were not expressing the religious commitment that Christianity calls for’, p. 211. Amen to that!
Another practical outworking of Hezbollah’s outreach to other confessions is perhaps even more unfamiliar to Western audiences – its establishment of the multi-confessional ‘Lebanese Brigade for Resisting Occupation’, which saw its first mission in 1998. This was composed of people who shared Hezbollah’s aim to liberate the south from Israeli occupation, but did not agree with the party’s ideological/theological distinctives, pp. 122-123. The Brigade was 38% Sunni, 25% Shia, 20% Druze and 17% Christian. By 1999 it had carried out 175 operations. Hence some of the ‘Hezbollah’ actions in this period were actually effected by people from other sects. Thus, the news that 82% of Lebanese are behind Hezbollah’s present resistance should not surprise us. This figure means that Hezbollah is enjoying support across the confessional spectrum. The importance of this fact is that it makes the US/Israeli and Blairite aim of isolating Hezbollah that more difficult; indeed, those confessional leaders opposing Hezbollah on this issue are likely to isolate themselves. Resisting Israeli occupation is a popular Lebanese activity.
Qassem presents the jihad as characterised by flexibility and secrecy, p. 69ff, and one method employed – although not to the extent that some people imagine – was that of ‘martyrdom operations’, p. 75. Of course, many operations resulted in the martyrdom of mujahideen, but it was a feature in the calculations of the Resistance. Qassem, noting the asymmetrical character of the military balance, observes: ‘The power imbalance could only be equalized through martyrdom’, p. 74, and further observes ‘Martyrdom renders the military power threatening death ineffective, for such a menace acts only upon those who fear it, and is powerless in front of those who seek it’, p. 75. Of course, the example of Hezbollah has been followed by many other groups since.
On this issue, it should be noted that Hezbollah denounced 9/11, p. 250, and there is no solid evidence to link the group with Al-Qaida – indeed Zarqawi even denounced Hezbollah as accomplices to the Israelis! Hezbollah states that it distinguishes US civilians from the government. Of course, this immediately raises questions about the abduction of foreigners before 1991, and Qassem denies direct Hezbollah involvement, p. 233. He also points out that other groups – including the Lebanese Forces and the Israelis – abducted people. This section might be the most unconvincing to Western readers, especially as they remember the 1985 TWA hijacking. Qassem is on stronger ground when he notes that the practice of kidnapping by any group ‘was one of the by products of the Lebanese war’, p. 233, so hopefully this experience is ended as far as Lebanese Shia resistance is concerned (though whether Shia mujahideen outside Lebanon will respect this is open to question, especially in the present context).
Linked to this is what Qassem calls ‘The Target Sphere’. Whereas Al-Qaida feel free to operate anywhere in the globe, Hezbollah restricts itself to the occupied lands, and considers it ‘futile to target Israelis around the world’, p. 74. In regard to ‘Targeting Israeli Civilians’, this section essentially argues that since the Israelis do not restrict themselves to targeting ‘resistance combatants’ and have since 1948 committed many massacres of Arab civilians, resistance groups will follow suit, p. 175ff. This implies that if the Israelis changed policy, Hezbollah might reciprocate.
The book is very readable, and addresses other subjects – such as Hezbollah’s political and social work, its attitude to the Palestinian cause (in which it condemns Arafat’s ‘sell-out’ policies), relationships with Iran, Syria and Arab regimes, with Europe and the US. It is always best to go to the primary source to see what he actually says, and Qassem’s book is invaluable in this way. One can only hope that a time will emerge that Hezbollah’s military activity will cease because there is no longer any basis for it, and the group can concentrate on a purely political role as a political party. Unfortunately, that day looks far off.
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